Introduction, is clearly inadequate in 1986 as networking becomes ever more persuasive, portable computers make a mockery of the office as a location, and distributed processing makes obsolete notions of offices tied to a time and a place. Besides, the survey of 1984, on which at least part of this report is based, uses a different definition — a better one as it avoids some of the worst aspects of Giuliano's. Other critical concepts, such as efficiency and effectiveness, are not formally defined.

Whereas it may be argued that how one classifies the technology is a matter of preference, it should also be pointed out that the system used in this report of separating office automation as a distinct category from other types of office technology does not appear to make sense. Does not office technology constitute the tools by which office automation is achieved? Under the schema used in this report, where would 'smart' copiers which are also laser printers, fit in? They have been in use for years. A better exposition of office technology and automation is probably furnished by Meyer's classification of office automation items, based on their application rather than their characteristics.[1] Other topics, such as repetitive strain injury (p. 55), are dealt with in such a cursory manner that the information provided can be ambiguous or even misleading.

I suspect that it has been a devil of a report to write. Each of its chapters could quite comfortably have been a report in itself. It should, perhaps, never have been attempted in this form.

Geok Latham
Brisbane

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Theories of Industrial Society *by Richard Badham*
(Croom Helm, London, 1986) pp. 188, $49.95, ISBN 0-7099-3921-3.

Once upon a time, a great beast cast its shadow over the kingdom. Six wise men sought to tame it. But the beast grew so vast that the wise men failed, though they wrote long treatises on its nature. In time the king placed it on his coat of arms. Still the beast continued to dazzle the wise men, their students, and their students. Eventually they named the beast 'Industrial Society'.

The wise men — Henri de Saint-Simon, August Comte, Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber — also founded the social sciences. They contributed the basis for the major theories and methods. According to Richard Badham, their obsession with industrial society theory led to five main themes which continue to dominate our thinking in the social sciences. First, we think of the industrial revolution as the great divide between a primitive past and the modern present. All of our theories, capitalist and

Marxist, share this assumption. Second, we interpret the path of industrialisation as the only one, with societies evolving toward more complex industrial forms. Even when we discard simple linear models of social evolution, we persist in classifying the powerful states as the advanced industrial nations. Third, we reject alternative theories of social development if they do not assign primacy to industrialisation. When theories do not place industrial elements at the centre, we judge them as unrealistic. Fourth, recommendations for social change centre on industrial principles of organisation. When we social scientists speak on the development of the third world, for example, we limit ourselves to prescriptions for further industrialisation. Fifth, the achievement of an industrialised society equals progress. We overlook other kinds of achievement when we classify the nations of the world.

Badham has also come to tame the beast. He argues that the image of industrial society plays a dominant role in the social sciences. True enough. But what is more, this image, which he calls 'industrial society theory', underlies nearly all inquiry in the social sciences. It acts as a prism distorting the sociological imagination, and stands as an imperfect ideal to which all societies aspire. We social scientists are so confined by industrial society theory that we cannot see other interpretations or other paths for social development. This is disturbing.

Badham marshals his evidence thoroughly and methodically. He reminds us, for example, that sociology owes its origins, as an intellectual discipline, to concern over the disruptions caused by the French and industrial revolutions. The confluence of ideas first proposed during the Enlightenment helped sociology construct a powerful way of seeing the industrial revolution, and predisposed it to being captured by this same transformation.

With equal care, he reviews recent theoretical proposals, such as post-industrial society, and its step child, information society. In the late 1960s, social scientists, led by Daniel Bell, defined a new society based on a system of production drawing its primary resource from theoretical knowledge centring on the university. This would seem to be the first effort to break with the industrial mindset of previous social theory. Yet post-industrial theory assumes many of the same values, such as linear social evolution, progress, and technological determinism. Moreover, its main points of demarcation, the service workforce and increased knowledge, do not stand up to empirical testing. As Badham points out, 'post-industrialism' simply reworks the earlier industrial themes.

He proposes that the social sciences concentrate their efforts on investigating the role that new technologies play in opening up new social alternatives, 'technochoices' as he calls them. Having systematically dismantled industrial society theory, with its focus on technology as a central value, this seems to me to be an unusual choice. To his credit, he cautions against a simple interpretation of his proposal. He warns against falling into the error of technological determinism and its mirror image, technological neglect. He stresses that technology is neither a sufficient condition for achieving human ambitions, nor a goal in itself.

Badham's research question is: "How can technology be promoted out of a viable concern with social progress?" He elaborates two excellent examples of the kind of research program he recommends, one from the study of

communications technologies, the other from the study of modern energy technologies. By taking similar approaches, social scientists can identify alternative perspectives from which to study modern society, thus breaking from the confines of industrial society theory.

No review of this book can touch on every point, but three aspects of his approach present minor difficulties for interpretation and further scholarship. The term 'industrial society theory' is used throughout the book, giving the impression that there is a coherent statement of explanation for the concept of industrial society. Yet this is not so, as Badham himself recognises, noting that, "Industrial society theory, in the work of these theorists, is not a complete theoretical schema," and further on, "This theory . . . is not clearly based upon a set of specific 'testable' hypotheses, derived from a deductive system." At best there exists a large and loosely connected body of writing on the group of phenomena we label industrial society. Thus he is not critiquing a single theory, but rather a loosely defined literature.

Similarly, his focus on sociology as the sole discipline in which discussions of industrial society has taken place forces an inaccurate representation of the evolution of the social sciences. Claiming that sociology came to be recognised as the only discipline providing intellectual leadership for the developing world during the period after World War II, he mentions the postwar theories of Walt Rostow and John Kenneth Galbraith without recognising that they are primarily economists. In addition, his chapter on post-industrialism does not include the growing body of literature on this subject that has grown up in fields such as information science and communications. While it is true that the founding fathers of the concept of industrial society can be considered sociologists, those who followed spread to many fields. Indeed, the scope of *Prometheus* is testimony to the interdisciplinary nature of scholarship in the social sciences.

Badham's book is dense and presumes considerable previous knowledge of the literature with regard to industrial societies. Often one sentence suffices to encapsulate an entire sub-literature. Points fly by and yet demand attention. "Increasing employment in service occupations has often been at the expense of agriculture rather than manufacture." "The declining percentage of factory workers has often been exaggerated." "Amongst the general public, technological development and economic growth are no longer accepted as the unquestioned goal of modern societies." These statements, though peripheral to the main theme, move the argument along its course. But they are not supported in a way that facilitates inquiry by the scholar, and since they are also controversial, I wished for more elaboration or references. Nevertheless, if one is willing to overlook these annoyances, one finds a rich, thought-provoking discussion.

Badham's problem is enormous. His intent is to alert us to a pervasive and insidious influence within the social sciences, but one which has no convenient label. The importance of Badham's thesis lies in his recognition that the idea of industrial society acts as a tradition within the social sciences confusing the exact nature of many of industrial society's dimensions and limiting alternative explanations. One hopes that in his future work he will devote attention to reducing the ambiguities of the argument and seek more precise terms.

This critique should shake any complacent acceptance of the assumptions which underlie all theories of industrial society. Badham's goal, to provide the social sciences with the basis for including alternative perspectives, should be welcomed by those struggling with the rigidities of old classification schemes. For myself, grappling with the characteristics of information-oriented industrial societies, Badham presents much that must be taken into consideration.

Ultimately, like previous social theorists, he believes in the uses of sociological inquiry for the attainment of a more humane future. His own summary is best, "Industrial society theory may be one of the most impressive conceptual dinosaurs in social theory, but its bulk and long history must not deflect attention from the basic flaws in its design." Badham has not yet tamed the beast, though he has roped it. His future writings should be of great interest to us all.

Jorge Reina Schement
University of California, Los Angeles

Connecting You — Bridging the Communications Gap *by Ian Reinecke*
(McPhee Gribble/Penguin, Fitzroy, Victoria 1985) pp. 202, $7.95,
ISBN 0 14 008585 8.

In his introduction to *Connecting You — Bridging the Communications Gap,* Ian Reinecke asks: "What sort of communications system could we have if we required that it promote democracy, information sharing, decentralisation, and social equity?" He argues that the communications system and industry should serve citizens rather than simply institutions, whether corporations or government agencies.

The book began as a report on the future of telecommunications technology commissioned by the Australian Telecommunications Employees' Association. The ATEA has provided a valuable public service by sponsoring this informative and thoughtful study of new technologies and options for shaping the telecommunications system, a system which functions as the nervous system of the so-called 'information society'.

Although intended as background to the discussion of information society issues, the chapters on technology and services, including, for example, telephones, facsimile, computers and printers, teletex and vieotex (*sic*), PABX and local area networks, etc. are particularly useful as clearly written and relatively up-to-date descriptions of new technologies and their applications.

The analytical chapters of the book are less satisfying. Although I share Reinecke's concern with the need for citizen access and participation, I find his rejection of the marketplace as having any role in achieving these goals unconvincing and frequently misinformed.

Reinecke finds the US deregulatory approach highly flawed, and appears enamoured of the French approach of distributing information technology throughout society as national policy. Surely both approaches deserve more careful scrutiny. It is true that the deregulation of US telecommunications has frequently resulted in increasing local service charges, threatening the concept of universal service, a matter of great concern to consumer groups and