Cambridge Handbook of Responsible Artificial Intelligence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives S. Voeneky, P. Kellmeyer, O. Mueller and W. Burgard (eds) (2022) 500pp., £150 hardback, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, ISBN: 9781009207867

Over the millennia, people have developed normative standards, legal frameworks, personal capabilities and moral theories for assigning responsibility to a complex interacting web of humans, as well as the groups they form. Where responsibilities lie is not always straightforward, partially because responsibility may include different concepts. Nicole Vincent (2011) distinguishes six responsibility concepts in her taxonomy. First, virtue responsibility, where calling someone responsible is to say something that is good about their character, as exemplified in their reputation for doing what is seen to be the right thing. Second, role responsibility, which can be seen as someone’s obligation, given the social or institutional role they have taken on, or that has been assigned to them. Third, outcome responsibility, where being responsible would imply that someone is blameworthy for their actions and/or the outcomes of their actions. Fourth, causal responsibility, whereby to be responsible is to cause or to create the conditions for various outcomes. Fifth, capacity responsibility refers to an individual’s mental cognitive and volitional capacities, which determine their moral agency and the extent to which they can be held responsible for their actions. Finally, liability responsibility refers to the act of holding someone responsible for what happened. Holding someone responsible ‘refers to the things that someone must do, or how they should be treated, to set things right’ (Vincent, 2011, p.18).