When the United States entered World War I in 1917, there was no elaborate framework for providing scientific advice to the government. Engineers and scientists struggled to find an appropriate mechanism, but the former found themselves subordinated to a scientific community which sought to dominate emerging structures. At stake was not merely the credit for helping win the war, but also an advantage in the coming postwar definition and expansion of industrial research. Scientific leaders sought advantage by making a distinction between ‘engineering research’ and engineering practice, and claiming jurisdiction over the former.
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257 – 268
DOI
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Issues
Also in this issue:
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Agnes Horvath, Magic and the Will to Science: A Political Anthropology of Liminal Technicality
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Gibson Burrell, Ronald Hartz, David Harvie, Geoff Lightfoot, Simon Lilley and Friends, Shaping for Mediocrity: The Cancellation of Critical Thinking at our Universities
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Bas de Boer, How Scientific Instruments Speak: Postphenomenology and Technological Mediations in Neuroscientific Practice
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Bjørn Lomborg, False Alarm
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How does innovation arise in the bicycle sector? The users’ role and their betrayal in the case of the ‘gravel bike’
Engineering Organization and the Scientist in World War I: The Search for National Service and Recognition
Original Articles